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Preface
With the advent of the modern information based society which is
founded the unhindered communication of expression and informa-
tion; there has been a steady increase in the significance accorded to
the freedom of expression and the right to information in legal sys-
tems all over the world based upon the democratic ideal.
The steady advancements in the sphere of modern communication
and the progress of the media has meant that today it is possible to
use and exchange information in ways which would not have been
envisioned a few decades ago. With the increase in the importance
granted to the exchange of ideas and information between individuals
there has been a corresponding increase in the significance accorded
to Copyright within legal frameworks and a stricter supervision on
the protection of Copyright.
The tension between copyright and the freedom of speech in mod-
ern society stems from the inevitability of the clash of opposing in-
terests between those creating information and expression to control
its use, dissemination and financial exploitation and the interests of
the public in the use, enjoyment, communication of such creations.
As such has been a very real interest in different legal systems of
finding a means by which the discord between these competing values
may be reconciled.
In view of the emerging interest in the exploration of a means by
which an equilibrium maybe affected between these competing val-
ues, I have sought to explore the possibility of the introduction of a
public interest exception to copyright within the European Union
Member States.
The research culminating in this thesis was carried out by me while
a student of the LLM Program at the Munich Intellectual Property
Law Center (MIPLC) during the period from October 2008 to
September 2009.
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Copyright, the Freedom of Expression and the Right
to Information: The Persisting Discord
Introduction
The persisting discord between copyright protection, the freedom of
expression and the right to information, is an inherent feature of every
system of modern copyright law.
As such, the exploration of possible means by way of which an
adequate equilibrium maybe achieved between these competing val-
ues is an issue meriting high priority within any legal framework
which values and espouses these fundamental freedoms.
The United States seeks to reconcile this discord primarily through
the application of the fair use exception to copyright, arguably with
a substantial level of success.
The fair use exception to copyright which proceeds upon the basis
that certain unauthorized uses of copyright-protected material may in
particular instances be justified on the ground that such use consti-
tutes a “fair use” of such material, is a doctrine of broad scope and
great flexibility which is intended to facilitate the maintenance of a
healthy equilibrium between these conflicting interests.
It is noted however, that as at present it is difficult to identify a
doctrine of comparable dimensions within the legal frameworks of
the European Union (hereinafter the “EU”) Member States. This is
notwithstanding the high degree of significance conferred upon the
preservation and promotion of the freedom of expression and infor-
mation by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
which has been implemented into the domestic legal frameworks of
many of the EU Member States.
However, a salutary feature in the development of copyright law
in Europe in recent years has been the recognition of a fledgling




https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845231266, am 26.10.2021, 12:36:37
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
confined to a narrow scope of application. This has offered fresh
stimulus to the debate surrounding copyright and the freedom of ex-
pression by virtue of the potential it offers to develop into a means
by which a reconciliation maybe achieved between these competing
values.
The Public Interest Exception to Copyright: A Brief Overview
The public interest exception to copyright is founded upon the con-
ception of copyright as a doctrine of social good which is designed
to promote and preserve the interests of society as a whole. As such
it forms a general exception to copyright in accordance with which
certain unauthorized uses of copyright protected material may be ex-
empted from liability where it is established that such use qualifies
as a reasonable use of that material in the legitimate interests of the
public.
Thus akin to the fair use exception in the United States the public
interest exception constitutes a defense to copyright infringement
which applies across the board to all categories of rights conferred
under copyright and to every type of subject matter that maybe pro-
tected under copyright. Therefore this holds a definite advantage over
existing statutory exceptions to copyright which may operate only in
relation to specific types of subject matter and be limited in applica-
tion to certain categories of rights.
The following hypothetical fact situations may serve to provide a
more lucid illustration as to the nature and scope of the uses which
could come within the public interest exception to copyright.
Hypothetical 1:
The World Soft-Ball Cricket Championships are being held in
Smashville Australia. During one of the matches Sean Spinner makes
a comment with allegedly racist connotations to Bobby Blaster from
the opposing team. After the game Blaster confronts Spinner inside
the Stadium and punches him in the face. The altercation is caught
1.
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on camera by the TV-Crew from Sports TV which has exclusive ac-
cess to the stadium and the private quarters reserved for the players.
Sports TV retains the footage in its archives but decides against its
immediate release to the public. However an employee of Sports TV
releases the footage to Scoop Times a newspaper and to Explore Inc.
a film company.
The next day Scoop Times carries a front page story with the head-
ing Blaster Blows His Cool carrying a detailed account of the incident
which took place in the Smashville Stadium the previous day. The
article also includes an image of Blaster punching Spinner in the face
which is a reproduction of an image taken from the footage belonging
to Sports TV.
Explore Inc. releases a documentary entitled Racism in the Field:
The Ugly Side of Sport which contains a five minute clip of the footage
showing the altercation between Blaster and Spinner, in order to il-
lustrate the manner in which racist remarks on the field could erupt
into violence and comments upon the measures that could be taken
by international sports committees to prevent racism in sports.
David Fans a 15 year old student who watches the documentary on
his home television records the footage containing the altercation
between Blaster and Spinner and uploads it to mytube.com a popular
internet forum for sharing videos. The video becomes instantly pop-
ular and is watched by millions of viewers.
Hypothetical 2:
Professor Isabelle Laroche is a paleontologist. During her research
she discovers a fossil of a hitherto unknown species of mammal that
became extinct during the last ice age. Using the fossil and cutting
edge technology she carefully reproduces a drawing of what the ac-
tual animal would have looked like. She presents her findings and the
drawing at a paleontology conference, the participation in which is
limited to an exclusive group of invitees.
Science Weekly a magazine dedicated to natural science publishes
an article concerning the findings made by Isabelle Laroche and re-
produces the diagram of the mammal taken from a research paper
17
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distributed among the participants of the conference without the per-
mission of Professor Laroche.
Hypothetical 3:
A music band the Wannabees composes a new track. The track is
made up of segments of different songs that were popular during the
early 1980’s arranged and supplemented in intervals by music com-
posed by the Wannabees.
Surprisingly the arrangement of the different tracks come together
to form a single composite song and it becomes an instant hit.
The Thesis: Object, Scope and Methodology
The object of this thesis is therefore to analyze the development, in-
terpretation and application of the public interest doctrine in the ju-
risdictions of England, France and Germany and to consider the po-
tential it offers in developing into a broad and general exception to
copyright protection, capable of resolving the existing tensions bet-
ween copyright protection and the competing values of the freedom
of expression and the right to information.
These three jurisdictions have been selected on the basis that they
represent three different legal traditions of copyright law. England
offers a model of the Anglo-American common law tradition, while
France and Germany consist of jurisdictions which reflect the civil
law tradition based on the distinction inter alia between author’s
rights and neighboring rights. Of these it may be seen that France
adopts a dualist approach1 to copyright while Germany can be seen
to take a monist approach.2
2.
1 French law views the personal and economic and societal interests as separate,
yet forming a duality. Dana Beldiman Fundamental Rights, Author’s Right and
Copyright-Commonalities or Divergences? 29 COLUM J.L & ARTS 39, 41
Note 3 (2005).
2 German law views the personal and economic and societal interests as being
intertwined. Id Note 4.
18
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Hence these jurisdictions represent examples of the three primary
traditions of copyright law. It is hoped that a review of the develop-
ments that have been taking place in them would assist in offering a
comprehensive view of the issues that would arise in attempting to
introduce a public interest exception to copyright law within the
Member States of the European Union.
In the course of this analysis, the thesis shall also proceed to con-
sider factors which could potentially limit the expansion of a public
interest exception to copyright; primarily the “three step test” to
copyright limitations under the Berne Convention as well as the EC
Copyright Directive which could pose a potential impediment to the
development of a broad-based exemption to copyright.
Throughout this thesis, reference shall be made to the fair use doc-
trine in the US in considering the scope and expansion the public
interest exception may hope to achieve, and parallels will be drawn
between the approaches in the US and Europe with regard to copy-
right and the freedom of expression and information.
The Discord in Context : A Case of Competing Interests
The persisting discord between copyright and the freedom of expres-
sion and the attendant right to information stems from the primary
character of copyright as an exclusive legal monopoly granted to an
author in relation to the original, literary or artistic expression em-
bodied in his work.
The exclusive monopoly thus created over original expression has
the potential to impose serious limitations upon the manner in which
individual members of the public or the public at large may access,
utilize or disseminate that expression, or build upon such expression
through the creation of derivative works.
The value accorded to the promotion and preservation of the free-
dom of expression and the right to information in contemporary ju-
risprudence and its significance to the progress and development of
modern democratic society remains unchallenged. As such they have
B.
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been expressed and recognized as fundamental human freedoms in a
multitude of international instruments, including notably the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)3 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).4
On the other hand the significance of copyright as a mechanism by
which to secure and promote creative expression and innovation in
society has considerably enhanced in the context of the contemporary
information based society.
Thus the clash point between these competing values arises in the
context of the role each of them play as instruments which ensure the
continued generation of creative expression within society, albeit
based upon two diametrically opposing viewpoints.
The fundamental freedoms enunciated above seek to achieve this
aim by ensuring to all individuals unfettered liberty as to the access
and use of creative works in order that they may be enriched by the
creativity and artistry contained therein and be further inspired and
enabled to continue the process of generating creative expression
within society.
Copyright on the other hand seeks to sustain such creative process
by offering an incentive to individuals to participate in the process of
creative innovation by allowing them the ability to exercise exclusive
rights over their works so that they may gain an economic profit cor-
responding to the personal and financial investment that has gone into
the creation of their works.
Hence the issue arises as to the means by which a sufficient equi-
librium maybe reached between these adverse viewpoints in a way
3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 19 “Everyone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” December 10, 1948 G.A.
res. 217A (III).
4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Article 19 (2) “Ev-
eryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regard-
less of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
any other media of his choice.” December, 16, 1966, G.A. res. 2200A [XX1].
20
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that would maximize their common goal of promoting and preserving
the generation of creative expression within society.
The Public Interest Dimension of Copyright
A possible means of resolving the aforesaid conflict is offered by the
school of thought which views both copyright and the freedom of
expression as being based upon the same fundamental equilibrium as
enumerated above.5 Hence the key to resolving the persisting tension
depends upon the achievement of the right balance between the pri-
vate interests and public rights protected through each one of these
values.
An indication as to the manner in which such a balance maybe
achieved is offered by the notion of copyright as a doctrine of public
interest or an instrument of social good that seeks to bestow on society
as a whole the benefit of the generation of creative expression.
This conception of the need to balance the rights of authors against
the legitimate interests of the public is also reflected in Article 27 of
the UDHR which provides to everyone the right to the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary
or artistic production of which he is an author, while simultaneously
enumerating the right accorded to everyone to freely participate in
the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits.
Hence based upon this view of copyright law, if the ultimate aim
of copyright is to secure the public interest in the generation of cre-
ative and artistic works, it may be argued that the scope of the private
exclusive right that is accorded to the copyright owner should be de-
fined within the scope of such public interest and that the exclusive
rights accorded under copyright should be suitably limited so as to
C.
5 Paul L.C. Torremans Copyright (and Other Intellectual Property Rights) as a
Human Right, in Intellectual Property and Human Rights 197 Wolters Kluwer
(Paul L.C. Torremans ed.2008).
21
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prevent a copyright holder from deriving profit from his creation in
a manner adverse to the legitimate interests of the public.
Seeking a Suitable Mechanism to Achieve the Right
Balance
A divergence can be perceived in the views of the copyright com-
munity as to the most effective means by which the tension between
these competing interests maybe resolved.
One viewpoint expounds that the idea-expression dichotomy of
copyright presents a means by which this tension may be reconciled
within the inherent conceptual framework of copyright itself. In ac-
cordance with this view since the protection granted under copyright
extends only to the expression of a work and not to the facts and ideas
underlying such expression, this forms a limitation within the con-
ceptual framework of copyright itself which prevents copyright from
unreasonably encroaching upon the guarantee of free speech.6
However it has been noted that although the line between idea and
expression is often hard to discern, the point of divergence between
idea and expression is not intended to vary, thus robbing the doctrine
of much needed flexibility in developing into an efficient tool by
means of which such reconciliation maybe attempted.7
It has also been pointed out that although at one point of the evo-
lution of copyright it would have been true to hold that copyright only
protected expression and therefore it would have been possible to
avoid infringement through merely using the factual or conceptual
information contained in the copyrighted work, present day realities
do not allow for such a simplistic interpretation.8 For example in cer-
D.
6 Melville B. Nimmer Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee
of a Free Speech and Press? 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1189 (1970).
7 Jay Dratler Jr. Fair Use in Copyright Law 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 233, 245
(1988).
8 Alexandra Sims The Public Interest Defence in Copyrightt Law: Myth or Re-
ality? 6 EIPR 335, 339 [2006].
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tain types of subject matter such as photographic works or phono-
grams the expression is so inextricably linked with the underlying
facts and the ideas that it is difficult to consider a means by which a
potential user could extract the information or concept embedded in
the work while leaving the expression intact.
On the other hand, an alternative means for bringing about a rec-
onciliation between these competing values has been suggested, by
the imposition of suitable exceptions and limitations to the exclusive
rights granted under copyright so as to ensure that these would not
unduly interfere with the rights of freedom of expression and infor-
mation of the public.
As Senftleben states,
“Limitations which serve the purpose of disseminating informa-
tion offer members of society the opportunity of receiving the in-
formation enshrined in works of intellect. For this reason they can
be understood as exponents of freedom of expression values.”9
Netanel’s argument for a democratic approach to copyright proceeds
on much the same basis. As he points out,
“The democratic approach would maintain the ideal of a strong
copyright, but would allow for a liberal use of exceptions and
limitations to copyright holder rights designed to make authors'
works more widely available.”10
Thus based upon this view it appears that the introduction of a limi-
tation or exception to copyright which would constrain the exercise
of exclusive rights granted under copyright from impinging upon the
domain of fundamental freedoms, as required for the maintenance of
a healthy equilibrium between these competing values, would be the
most effective means of resolving the existing tension.
9 Martin Senftleben Copyright Limitations and the Three Step Test 30 Kluwer
Law International [2004].
10 Neil Winestock Netanel Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the
Global Arena 51 VAND L. REV 217, 223 (1998).
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An Overview of the Conflict in the US and Europe
The United States
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution decrees that
“Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech or
the press.....11” (emphasis added). In its overall effect this provision
constitutes an implied constitutional guarantee of the freedom of ex-
pression.
Over time this constitutional guarantee has been further expanded
and developed through judicial interpretation with the effect that at
present it is considered to encompass both the right to receive and to
access information12 as well as the right to refrain from speech or
expression.13
Hence in terms of the primacy granted to the Constitution within
the legal framework of the United States, this constitutes a guarantee
of the freedom of expression and the right to information, accorded
at the highest level of the law.
The copyright clause of the Constitution that empowers congress
to secure “for limited Times to Authors…the exclusive Rights to
their…Writings…”14 provides legitimacy for the protection of copy-
right within the US legal framework.
Accordingly the Copyright Act15 grants to authors exclusive rights
in copyrighted works in relation to their reproduction, distribution,




11 U.S CONST. amend I.
12 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); N.Y Times Co. v. Sullivan
376 U.S 254 (1964).
13 Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539(1985).
14 U.S. CONST. art.I s.8 cl.8.
15 U.S. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C ss. 101-1332.
16 Id s. 106.
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Following the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976, it may now
be convincingly stated that copyright protection in the US is solely a
creature of statute and is nothing more than a privilege or fran-
chise17 granted by state to the author of “an original work of author-
ship fixed in a tangible medium of expression18”.
Thus the discord between the freedom of expression and copyright
arises through the existence of these competing constitutional values
within the US legal framework.
The constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech and the right
to information established under the First Amendment unequivocally
reinforces the argument in favour of effecting an equilibrium between
these fundamental freedoms and copyright within the US legal frame-
work, and over time various efforts have been made to reconcile the
persisting discord between these competing values.
However it is observed that in certain instances the US Courts have
sought to interpret the conflict between copyright and the fundamen-
tal freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment in a more re-
strictive manner.
A particularly notable example is the approach taken by the US
Supreme Court in the case of Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises,19 where the Court attempted to locate copyright within
the constitutional bounds of the First Amendment by modeling it as
an “engine of free speech” which encompasses the freedoms guar-
anteed under the Amendment within its scope; thereby making fur-
ther application of the First Amendment to copyright superfluous.
This approach which seeks to deny the existence of a conflict bet-
ween these competing values was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Eldred v. Ashcroft.20
The case concerned an application for a declaratory judgment that
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA) which sought to
17 Harry N. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of “Fair Use” in Copy-
right Law, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV.790,792 (1975).
18 17 U.S.C. s.106.
19 Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539(1985).
20 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003).
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extend the copyright term in the US by twenty years was unconsti-
tutional.
One of the arguments that was raised in the course of the proceed-
ings was that the extension of the copyright term was in violation the
First Amendment by reason that it forms a restriction on the freedom
of speech by limiting the opportunity to make use of works, which if
not for the extension of the copyright term, would be in the public
domain.21
The Supreme Court held that the CTEA did not violate the First
Amendment. Citing the dicta in Harper & Row Publishers it observed
that the idea-expression dichotomy of copyright law constituted an
in-built First Amendment accomodation which strikes a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and copyright law by permit-
ting the free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.22
Accordingly it held that where the traditional contours of copyright
protection have not been altered, further First Amendment scrutiny
was unnecessary.23 However, it significantly expressed a reservation
from the comment made by the Court of Appeals in the same case
that copyright is "categorically immune from challenges under the
First Amendment”.24
Thus the case of Eldred reserved to courts the possibility of First
Amendment scrutiny of copyright law where the the traditional con-
tours of copyright have in fact been altered, although it notably failed
to provide a definition as to what would constitute a departure from
the traditional contours of copyright.
21 Eric Eldred v. John D Ashcroft No 01-618 Oral Arguments, Wednesday Oc-
tober 9, 2002 at page11,
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
01-618.pdf.
22 See Harper Row, 471 U.S. at 788-789.
23 Id at 790.
24 Id. at 789-90 (citing Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3 d 372, 375 (2001)) accord. Birn-
hack, The Copyright and Free Speech Affair: Making and Breaking Up 43
IDEA 233, 233.
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Following the decision in Eldred this issue arose for discussion in
the cases of Kahle v. Gonzales,25 Luck’s Music v. Gonzales26 and
Golan v. Gonzales.27 Although in the cases of Kahle and Luck’s Mu-
sic the term traditional contours was restrictively interpreted to refer
to the idea-expression dichotomy of copyright and the doctrine of fair
use, the decision of the US Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in
the case of Golan v. Gonzalez marked a significant departure from
this interpretation.
The case involved a determination as to the constitutionality of s.
514 of the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA), which sought
to effect certain amendments to US law in order to bring it more in
line with its obligations under the Berne Convention.28
It involved inter alia the implementation into US law of Article 18
of the Berne Convention which required the restoration of the copy-
right of certain foreign works which had passed into the public do-
main in the US.29 This was challenged in courts as being a violation
of the First Amendment to the US Constitution.
In this instance the Court of Appeal unanimously upheld that the
traditional contours of copyright as described in Eldred extended be-
yond the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use exception and
determined that s.514 had altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection in a manner that implicated the right to freedom of ex-
pression.30 The decision of the Court of Appeal therefore establishes
that First Amendment scrutiny of copyright could in fact be triggered
by departures to copyright law other than to the traditional safeguards
to the First Amendment i.e. the idea-expression dichotomy and the
fair use exception.
25 Kahle v. Gonzales 487 F.3 d 697 (9th Cir. 2007).
26 Luck’s Music Library Inc. v. Gonzales 407 F.3 d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
27 Golan v. Gonzalez, No. 05-CV-1259 (10th Cir. Sep. 4, 2004).
28 Berne Convention for the protection of literary, artistic works 1886 (Paris Text
1971).
29 Id.Article 18.
30 See Golan v. Gonzales at 37.
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Thus it appears that following the decision in Golan v. Gonzalez,
there exists far greater potential for the review of copyright law with
regard to its compatibility with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the First Amendment, thereby offering greater scope for the
achievement of a satisfactory equilibirum between copyright and the
freedom of speech and the right to information within the US legal
framework.
Europe
Before embarking on an analysis of copyright and the freedom of
expression in Europe, it is useful to consider the nature of the copy-
right law framework within the EU Member States.
Firstly it is pertinent to note that as opposed to trademark and de-
sign law, the EU is yet to introduce a community wide copyright.31
Rather copyright law in the EU is based upon the individual national
copyright laws of the Member States which operate within their re-
spective territories.
However the EU has succeeded in introducing a degree of harmo-
nization in relation to certain specific aspects of copyright law
through a series of community directives which relate to such aspects
of the law as may have an effect on the free movement of goods and
services within the EU.
Hence a consideration of the existing tension between copyright
and the freedom of expression in Europe necessarily requires one to
consider the nature of the conflict between these competing values
as it exists in the individual legal frameworks of specific member
states, as well as an overall consideration of European Community
(hereinafter “EC”) law in relation to the specific areas in which copy-
right law has been the subject of community wide harmonization.
B.
31 Dreier and Hugenholtz Concise European Copyright Law 1 Kluwer Law
(2006).
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Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights32
(ECHR) (which has been ratified by all EC Member States) guaran-
tees the freedom of expression which includes the freedom to receive
and impart information. Hence it may be seen that the freedom of
expression in Europe is expressed in much narrower terms than in the
US.
The fundamental rights guaranteed under the ECHR constitute
general principles of Community law which are used as a standard in
the interpretation of Community law and a basis for actions against
Community institutions.33
However the guarantee of the freedom of expression under Article
10 is made subject to qualification by formalities as may be prescribed
by law and considered to be “necessary in a democratic society for
the protection of the rights of others”.
Hence it remains possible to argue that the limitations on the free-
dom of expression imposed by the copyright laws of Member States
fall within the scope of a formality prescribed by law which is ne-
cessary for the protection of the rights of others under Article 10 of
the ECHR. In fact the term “rights of others” has been held to include
a wide range of subjective rights which certainly includes the rights
protected by copyright.34
With regard to national constitutions, as Professor Hugenholtz
points out the protection granted to the freedom of expression does
not in most cases reflect the broad scope of Article 10.
However he identifies the German Constitution which provides for
a comprehensive three-tiered right to the freedom of expression in-
32 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
ETS 5 (1950); See Treaty on European Union Article 6(2) 31 ILM 247; 1992
O.J. (C191) 1.
33 Margot Horspool and Matthew Humphreys European Union Law 131 Oxford
University Press (4th ed. 2006).
34 P. Bernt Hugenholtz Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe
www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/PBH-Engelberg.doc at 5.
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corporating the freedom of opinion, the right to information as well
as the freedom of the media as a notable exception.35
The French Constitution36 on the other hand does not contain an
express bill of rights. However the preamble to the Constitution ex-
pressly states its attachment to the Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen of 1789 which contains a guarantee of the freedom
of speech and of the press.37
This has been interpreted to imply that the principles laid down in
this instrument will have constitutional value within the current legal
framework in France and further that it is possible for the Constitu-
tional Court to declare unconstitutional legislation that infringes the
principles contained in the said document.38 Further in the case of
Danone the freedom of expression was expressly recognized as a
right guaranteed under the Constitution of France.39
In the UK the rights guaranteed under the ECHR have been im-
plemented into the domestic legal framework by the Human Rights
Act of 1998. S. 3 of the Act requires that all primary and secondary
legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible
with the Convention rights.40
Furthermore s.12 of the Act imposes a special safeguard with re-
gard to the freedom of expression. This provision introduces a special
consideration for the balancing of the interests of the freedom of ex-
pression and copyright in the public interest by requiring courts to
have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to
the freedom of expression where proceedings relate to journalistic,
literary or artistic material, the publication of which would be in the
public interest.
35 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art.5 (F.R.G.).
36 LA CONSTITUTION FRANCAISE (1958) [Constitution].
37 Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du citoyen art. 11 (1798).
38 Decisions of the Constitutional Council 71-44 DC of 16 July 1971 and 73-51
DC of 27 December 1973.
39 Paris 30 April 2003, Ubiquité-Rev dr. techn. Inf,. 2003/17,81, note J Verbeek
and A. Wybo.
40 UK Human Rights Act (1998) s.3 (1).
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Hence it appears that although in comparison to the United States
it is not possible to always identify a clearly expressed guarantee of
the freedom of expression within the domestic legal frameworks of
EU Member States, the freedom of expression forms an ingrained
value of the normative framework of most of these states.
Thus the existence of a clear conflict can be discerned between the
freedom of expression (as recognized within domestic laws as well
as under the ECHR) and the laws and principles relating to copyright
within these legal frameworks.
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The US Approach to Resolving the Tension:
The Fair Use Exception
The Fair Use Exception: A Brief Overview of its
Rationale, Scope and Development
One of the basic rationales of copyright law is to afford an incentive
to create and disseminate new works, through the provision of ex-
clusive rights to authors in relation to the financial exploitation of
their works of authorship for a specific period of time.
However the establishment of a regime of exclusive rights has the
counter-effect of hindering creative effort on the part of subsequent
authors by fettering their ability to build upon the creativity of exist-
ing copyrighted works. As a consequence it imposes limits upon the
manner in which such subsequent authors may exercise their freedom
of expression and the ability of the public to benefit from the process
of creative innovation. The resulting contradiction is considered a
fundamental paradox of copyright law.
The US has opted to seek a solution to this fundamental paradox
through the introduction of a fair use exception to copyright law
which seeks to loosen the chains of exclusivity of copyright in ap-
propriate circumstances.41 Thus it has in one instance been described
as ‘a guarantee of breathing space at the heart of copyright’42
The fair use exception applies across the board to any copyright-
protected work and has the unique advantage over other statutory
exceptions of possessing the necessary degree of flexibility that
makes it adaptable to diverse situations and allows the accommoda-
tion of diverse policy interests within its scope.
III.
A.
41 Dratler, supra at 247.
42 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc. 510 U.S. 569 at 579.
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This inherent flexibility of the doctrine renders it a viable ‘balanc-
ing-tool’ between the conflicting interests of copyright and free
speech especially in view of the intrinsic complexity of such issues
that often require courts to make value judgments and to accomodate
diverse policy arguments.
On the other hand the statutory codification of the fair use excep-
tion under s. 107 of the Copyright Act which provides a consistent
legal framework within which the fair use exception maybe applied,
endows the doctrine with the necessary structure and certainty so as
to prevent its application from being abused to suit the subjective
preferences of judges.
In its essence the exception seeks to exempt from liability certain
modest uses of copyrighted works when those uses will not under-
mine the economic interests of the copyright owner,43 by providing
a defense to copyright infringement which proceeds on the basis that
the unauthorized use of a copyrighted work constitutes ‘fair use’ of
such work.
The cases of Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House Inc.44 and
Williams v. Wilkins45 illustrate two instances where the fair use ex-
ception was employed by courts to preserve the right to information
over the exclusive rights of copyright holders, where there was a
strong public interest argument in favor of the preservation of the
public’s right to information.
The statutory codification of the fair use doctrine under s. 107 of
the Copyright Act provides a non-exhaustive four factor test which
courts are bound to apply in reaching a determination as to whether
a particular use will qualify as a fair use of copyrighted material.46
43 Schechter and Thomas, Intellectual Property the law of Copyrights, Patents
and Trademarks, 213 Thomson West (2003).
44 Rosemont Enterprises v. Random House Inc. 366 F 2 d. 303 (2nd Cir. 1966).
45 Williams v. Wilkins 487 F.2 d 1345(Ct. Cl. 1973).
46 The four factors are as follows; the purpose and character of the use, the nature
of the copyrighted work, the substantiality of the portion used and the effect
of the use upon the potential market.
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An important clue towards understanding the legislative intention
behind the enactment of the four factor test is provided by the fol-
lowing statement in the House Report preceding its enactment.
‘Indeed the doctrine is an equitable rule of reason, no generally
applicable definition is possible and each case raising the ques-
tion must be decided on its own facts.’47
Thus as argued by one commentator, the language of the statute cou-
pled with the foregoing statement indicate that the objective of
Congress in enacting the four factor test was to provide a solid ana-
lytical basis for the application of the doctrine, without curtailing the
ability of the doctrine to achieve further development and transfor-
mation at the hands of the judiciary.48
Hence the fair use exception has been preserved within US law as
a flexible doctrine capable of adaptation, interpretation and develop-
ment, to suit changing socio-economic needs and advancements in
the field of technology. Thus courts in the US have been bestowed
with the ability to effect such development to the doctrine as and when
necessary.
Therefore considerable discretion has been vested with the judi-
ciary to develop and to utilize the fair use exception as a mechanism
to bring about an effective equilibrium between the competing values
of copyright on the one hand and the freedom of speech and the right
to information on the other.
Seeking a Comparable Doctrine in Europe
The basic approach to copyright limitations within the continental
legal systems has been through the enactment of statutory limitations
and exceptions to the exclusive rights granted therein. A consistent
characteristic of these limitations is that they are of a specified and
well defined scope and are therefore of inherent rigidity, robbing
B.
47 H.R REP no.1476 94th Cong. 2 d Sess. 65.
48 Dratler, supra at 260.
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them of the much needed flexibility to be used in accordance with the
discretion of judges.
In England where the copyright framework is based on the common
law, limitations and exceptions to copyright are based upon the statu-
tory limitations introduced under Chapter III of the Copyright, De-
signs and Patents Act of 1988 (“CDPA”) as well as a number of
common law defenses.
With regard to the statutory limitations under the CDPA it has been
noted by Laddie J that these “consist of a collection of provisions
which define with extraordinary precision and rigidity the ambit of
various exceptions to copyright protection.”49 Thus it is evident that
as far as the statutory limitations are concerned, these to a large extent
follow the model presented by the civil law tradition of continental
Europe and thus do not offer a comparable mechanism to the fair use
exception.
On the other hand one of the most widely used defenses to copy-
right infringement in England is the fair dealing defenses which are
found in s.29 and s.30 of the CDPA.
Under the fair dealing defenses, a person cannot be liable if they
can show that the infringing use of copyright constitutes:
(i) fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study – s.29
(1) and (1C)
(ii) fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review – s.30 (1); or
(iii)fair dealing for the purpose of reporting current events – s.30
(2)50
Although the defense does attempt to strike an equilibrium between
copyright and the freedom of expression and the right to information
and seeks to permit certain uses of copyright-protected material
which are characteristically regarded as those which promote the
49 Pro Sieben Media v. Carlton UK Television [1997] EMLR 509 cited in Lionel
Bentley and Brad Sherman Intellectual Property Law 199 Oxford University
Press (3rd ed.,2009).
50 See Bentley and Sherman, 202.
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public interest, the fair dealing defense cannot be used as a general
exception to copyright in the public interest.
Unlike the fair use exception in the US which is an exception of
general application the fair dealing defense is permitted only for the
purposes specifically listed under CDPA. It is thus irrelevant that the
use might be for a purpose not specified in the Act, or that it is fair
in general.51 As Ungoed-Thomas J pointed out in the case of Beloff
v. Pressdram Ltd.52 the relevant fair dealing must be fair dealing for
the approved purpose and not dealing with what might be fair for
some other purpose or fair in general. Thus the scope of the defense
is limited to the particular categories of uses as defined under s. 29
and s.30 of the CDPA.
Hence it is clear that the prevailing established limitations and ex-
ceptions to copyright within Europe do not offer the inherent flexi-
bility or scope of the fair use exception in the US which would enable
them to achieve an efficient balance between copyright on the one
hand and the freedom of expression and the right to information on
the other.53
51 Id.
52 Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd., (1973) 1 All E.R. 241.
53 Althought the fair use exception specifies certain categories of uses which
would normally constitute fair use of copyrighted material these form mere
guidelines that are designed to assist in the determination as to whether a par-
ticular use is fair or not, unlike under the fair dealing exception they do not in
any way limit the categories of uses to which the fair use exception applies.
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The Emerging Public Interest Exception to
Copyright in Europe
In the light of the foregoing discussion it is useful to consider the
possibility of the introduction of a public interest exception to copy-
right in Europe.
The envisaged exception would ideally be based upon the norma-
tive framework of the fundamental freedoms contained in the do-
mestic legal frameworks of the Member States as well as the overall
guarantee of the freedom of expression and the right to information
under the ECHR. It would be framed in broad and general terms akin
to the fair use exception of the US but be similarly subject to a basic
framework of operation so as to prevent it from being used for the
arbitrary curtailment of the individual rights of the copyright holder.
The remainder of this Chapter shall constitute an analysis of efforts
taken in the jurisdictions under review, namely England, France and
Germany, to introduce a public interest exception to copyright within
their domestic legal frameworks. It shall strive to analyze the nor-
mative structure and conceptual underpinnings of these legal frame-
works in terms of their conduciveness to the introduction of a broad
based public interest exception to copyright and the manner in which
current judicial and legislative approaches to copyright and the free-
dom of expression in these jurisdictions may herald the development
of any future exception to copyright based upon the public interest.
England
The emergence of a fledgling public interest defense in English law
can be traced back to the breach of confidence claims where it oper-
ated as a defense to the unauthorized disclosure of confidential in-
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continued maintenance of its secrecy was considered iniquitous and
its disclosure was considered to be in the public interest.
Hence the defense was originally limited to instances where the
information which was sought to be disclosed was linked with some
sort of iniquity or misconduct on the part of the plaintiff.54
With the passage of time, the defense gradually evolved into an
independent common law defense of public interest which would ap-
ply even in the absence of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff
where any “higher duty” for disclosure was seen to exist.55 It has been
described as a defense outside and independent of statutes, not limited
to copyright cases and based upon general principles of common
law.56
The development of the public interest defense in the Copyright
law of England was triggered with the express recognition by Un-
goed-Thomas J in the case of Beloff v. Pressdram57 that,
“Public interest as a defence in law, operates to override the
rights of the individual (including copyright), which would oth-
erwise prevail and which the law is also concerned to protect.”
(emphasis added)
The case of Lion Laboratories Ltd. v. Evans marked the further ex-
pansion and refinement of the doctrine where it was for the first time
directly applied to an action for copyright infringement. The case
involved the unauthorized disclosure of confidential documents con-
taining information which went to reveal that the intoximeters used
by the police to measure the blood alchohol levels of motorists were
faulty and that therefore a significant number of motorists may have
been wrongly convicted.
In this case it was conclusively held that there was no requirement
of evidence of an immoral act or inequity on the part of the Plaintiff
54 Rachel A.Yurkowski Is Hyde Park Hiding the Truth? 51 VUWL REV. 4
(2001) http://www.austlii.edu.au/nz/journals/VUWLRev/2001/51.html.
55 Lion Laboratories v. Evans (1985) QB 526 cited id.
56 Beloff v. Pressdram Ltd., (1973) 1 All E.R. 241 at 260.
57 Id.
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in order to give rise to the defense. Thus this decision did much to
bring closer the possibility of founding an independent public interest
defense in copyright law.
The introduction of a public interest defense to copyright under
English law gained further impetus with the enactment of the Copy-
right Designs and Patents Act of 1988. The 1981 Green Paper pre-
ceding the Act stated that,
“…the public interest demands that not every unauthorized re-
production of copyrighted material should constitute an infringe-
ment of copyright.”58
When the Act finally came into being s.171 (3) seemingly introduced
a statutorily codified public interest defense to English copyright law.
“Nothing in this Part affects any rule of law preventing or re-
stricting the enforcement of copyright, on grounds of public inter-
est or otherwise.”
Despite this gathering momentum in favour of the recognition of a
defense to copyright law based upon the public interest the develop-
ment of the exception suffered a considerable setback with the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeal in the case of Hyde Park v. Yelland.59
The case concerned an application for summary judgement against
the Sun newspaper for the unauthorized publication of video stills of
Diana Princess of Wales and Dodi Al Fayed which had been taken
from a video film of which the Plaintiff was the copyright holder.
The Defendant argued that the unauthorized publication of the im-
ages were in the public interest since it sought to expose the falsity
of a statement made to the media by a third party, Mohammed Al
Fayed.
In the High Court, the Plaintiffs argued that no public interest ex-
ception to copyright existed in English law and that the fair dealing
58 Reform of the Law Relating to Copyright, Design and Performer’s Protection,
Cmnd 8302, HMSO, July 1981.
59 Hyde Park v. Yelland [2000] RPC 604 (CA); [1999] RPC 655 (HC).
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exception to copyright under the CDPA expressed the extent to which
infringement could be justified.
They further argued that s.171(3) of the CDPA did not provide a
public interest defense to copyright infringement but was a mere
statement to the effect that if such a defense existed under the present
legal framework it was preserved.
This argument was effectively rejected by Jacob J who made an
express statement to the effect that a public interest defense to copy-
right existed and was recognized -not merely preserved- by s. 171 (3)
of the Copyright Act.60
A further argument was made against the recognition of a public
interest defense on the basis that for the court to go outside the spec-
ified exceptions to copyright provided under the CDPA and to enforce
some undefined public interest limitation would amount to judicial
legislation, involving the court in controversial questions of public
policy and thereby bring the law into disrepute.
This argument was also refuted by Jacob J, who observed that the
need to balance the freedom of expression and the right to respect for
private life under the Articles 10 and 8 of the ECHR would involve
judges in the same or similar sort of exercise as was involved in the
application of a public interest defense.61
Thus the decision of the High Court in this instance constituted an
unequivocal statement by English courts recognizing a statutorily
granted public interest defense to copyright under s.171(3) which
could be applied in order to bring about about an equilibirum between
the interests of copyright owners and the freedom of expression and
information of the public.
In the Court of Appeal however Aldous J having ruled on the in-
applicability of the defense of fair dealing upon the basis that the
information which was reproduced did not relate to current events,
rejected the existence of a public interest defense to copyright based
upon s.171(3) on the following grounds.
60 Hyde Park v. Yelland [1999] RPC 655 at 667.
61 Id. at 671.
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Firstly he determined that copyright being a property right granted
under the CDPA which also provides for express exceptions to this
right in the public interest, it would be wrong for a court having re-
jected the application of these statutory exceptions to further restrict
such right based upon an independent defense of public interest. In
his view s. 171(3) was a mere recognition of the court’s inherent
jurisdiction not to allow its processes to be used in a way contrary to
the policy of the law.
Secondly he referred to the idea expression dichotomy in copyright
law, and stated that copyright seeks to protect the expression of in-
formation and not the information itself. Hence in his view there
could not be a rational basis for the extension of the public interest
defense existing in relation to breach of confidence claims which seek
to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information to acts of copy-
right infringement which were concerned with the unauthorised use
of the expression of information.
Thirdly he also referred to the fact that the acceptance of a general
defense of public interest could be contrary to the international obli-
gations of England i.e. the Berne Covention and TRIPS Agreement
three-step test relating to copyright exceptions.
Mance J delivering an independent judgment, also denied the ex-
istence of a public interest defense to copyright based upon the dis-
parity between the interests that were protected by the breach of con-
fidence action and copyright infringement. He noted that copyright
being a proprietary right and confidence being a personal interest it
was not possible to collaborate them into one claim and to defend
them with the same defense i.e. the defense of public interest. How-
ever he did accept the view that Parliament had intended via s.171(3)
for the courts to retain some discretion to refuse copyright protection
on public interest grounds.62
While the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hyde Park v. Yelland
seemed to put an effective stop to the continued recognition of a pub-
lic interest defense within the English copyright law system, a further
62 Hyde Park v. Yelland [2000] RPC 604 at 628.
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twist was effected to this already convoluted tale by the decision giv-
en by the Court of Appeal in the case of Ashdown v. Telegraph
Group63 which allowed the court the opportunity to reconsider the
stance it had taken in Hyde Park.
This case related to the publication in the Sunday Telegraph news-
paper of excerpts of a secret memorandum concerning a possible pact
between two British political parties i.e. the Labour Party and the
Liberal Party. Upon the failure of sufficient grounds to establish a
defense based upon fair dealing, the newspaper brought up the de-
fense that the publication was in the public interest.
The Court of Appeal although it refused to uphold the application
of the public interest defense to the facts under review, rejected Al-
dous J’s dicta on the public interest defense in English law.
The Court reviewed the law relating to the public interest defense
in the light of the Human Rights Act of 1998.64
It stated that the principles laid down in Hyde Park could not be
held binding on the courts since the decision had been tendered prior
to the coming into force of the Human Rights Act of 1988, and further
stated that that the restriction imposed upon the freedom of expression
under the CDPA had to be considered individually in every case in
order to determine whether such restriction was necessary in a demo-
cratic society.
The Court of Appeal went on to state that the restriction on the
freedom of expression can be justified where it was necessary for the
protection of copyright, since the infringement of copyright consti-
tuted an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and
with rights recognized under international conventions and under EU
law.
While referring once more to the idea-expression dichotomy in
copyright to support the view that on the face of it copyright would
not normally impinge upon the freedom of expression since it did not
prevent the publication of information, it recognized that such a con-
63 Ashdown v. Telegraph Group [2001] 3 WLR 1368.
64 See Bentley and Sherman at 220.
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flict could arise in instances where the expression of the information
necessitated the reproduction of specific texts or images.
The Court held that in such cases if the defenses of fair dealing and
refusal of discretionary relief would not protect the public interest, a
defendant could invoke the public interest defense as developed by
common law and acknowledged under s.171(3).
Thus the Court expressly stated that in rare circumstances the right
to the freedom of expression could override rights conferred under
the CDPA as a matter of public interest. On the other hand it ac-
knowledged the fact that the circumstances in which the public inter-
est may override copyright are not capable of precise categorization
or definition.
This is significant by virtue of the fact that it consitutes an ac-
knowledgement by the court that the statutory exceptions stipulated
in the CDPA may not always be sufficient in striking a balance bet-
ween copyright and the freedom of expression, and a recognition of
the need for a general public interest defense which would function
in situations where other exceptions were not applicable.
It also reflects an acceptance by the courts of the need for a general
public interest exception to copyright which is flexible and capable
of being applied at the discretion of the judges where the specific
statutory exceptions are not capable of balancing the competing in-
terests of copyright and the freedom of expression.
Hence the present stance of English law as regards the public inter-
est exception to copyright maybe summarized as follows.
Following Ashdown it may be stated that courts have recognized
the fact that a public interest defense does in fact exist under English
law. It has further acknowledged the need for such a defense based
upon the obligation to balance the interests of copyright and the free-
dom of speech as required under the Human Rights Act of 1998.
However the scope of the defense as currently defined by the courts
is considerably narrow. Firstly notwithstanding the substantial de-
velopment that it has undergone following its intial application to
actions relating to copyright infringment in Lion Laboratories v.
Evans it has consistently been interpreted in relation to its original
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application vis a vis claims for breach of confidence. Its present ap-
plication in English law demonstrates the use of the public interest
defense more as a supplementary defense to breach of confidence
actions where such actions involve a claim of copyright infringement
pleaded as an alternative claim to the action, as opposed to an inde-
pendent defense to copyright infringement. As such its application
has been restricted to instances of unauthorized publication of un-
published works and to the disclosure of information as opposed to
the gamut of possible uses of copyrighted materials. Further it has
been interpreted to apply only in instances where other statutory ex-
ceptions notably the defense of fair dealing is not applicable.
Thus for example as regards the illustration in Hypothetical I the
unauthorized use of the copyright protected footage by Scoop Times
and Explore Inc. and its uploading onto the internet by David Fans
would come within the scope of the public interest exception to copy-
right in English law, since the footage consitutes an unpublished work
the dissemination of which is in the public interest. The same rea-
soning may apply with regard to the situation in Hypothetical 2 on
the basis that the drawing although it consitutes published material
in the sense that it has been presented at a conference, has not been
made accessible to the public at large.
Hence at present the public interest exception to copyright in En-
glish law represents a narrow doctrine which applies in relation to the
very specific aspect of the public’s right to information which has not
been disseminated to the public, where it cannot be reasonably an-
ticipated that such information will be disseminated by the copyright
owner.
In its current state of development through case law, it is thus of
considerably diminished value as a tool by which to achieve an equi-
libirum between copyright and the freedom of expression in com-
parison with the fair use exception in the US.
In view of the preceding discussion the issue arises as to the pos-
sibility of developing a public interest exception to copyright which
could serve as a defense to copyright infringement in any form, where
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such infringement can be proven to be supported by a substantially
strong degree of public interest.
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that within the present legal
framework of English law there is evident scope for the introduction
of a public interest defense to copyright.
As discussed above the statutory limitations to copyright under the
CDPA are sadly inadequate to effect a sufficient balance between
copyright and the freedom of expression and the right to information.
Apart from the fact that the inherent rigidity of these limitations
considerably limits the scope of their application many of these are
poorly drafted65 and others have not been updated to keep up with
technological developments,66 while some are so complicated that it
is difficult to imagine anyone seeking to rely on them.67
One of the primary issues that arise in considering the introduction
of a possible public interest exception to copyright in English law is
whether s. 171 (3) does in fact provide for the possibility of the in-
troduction of a broad-based public interest defense to copyright.
In this regard it is of worth to consider the legislative history pre-
ceding the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1988 and s.171(3).
The Whitford Committee68 which was established to consider
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1956 was presented with several
proposals as to the the clarfication and enlargement of existing lim-
itations to copyright law. One such proposal from a newspaper pub-
lishing group was to the effect that publication in the public interest
65 Burrell, Defending the Public Interest 9 EIPR 394,397
Id. note 31 See for example CDPA 1988 s.62 “Representation of Artistic Works
on Public Display”.
66 Id. note 32 See in particular CDPA 1988 s.29 “Fair Dealing for Purposes of
Research or Study”.
67 Id. note 33 See for example, CDPA 1988 s.33(1) “Anthologies for Educational
Use”.
68 Committee to Consider the Law of Copyright and Designs. Chairman Mr. Jus-
tice Whitford.
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should be admitted as a defense, possibly subject to some limit on the
quantity or quality of the material published.69
Significantly however, an amendment which would have expressly
incorporated a general public interest defense into the Bill was with-
drawn after the Government argued that the amendement was both
superfluous and counterproductive.70
In its place s. 171(3) was inserted into the Bill during its Third
Reading.
In arguing against the inclusion of a statutory public interest de-
fense to copyright, Lord Beaverbrooke made the following observa-
tions.
“There is little point in codifying in a statute what is already
achieved by the courts, unless decisions need developing or re-
fining. The amendment does not add to the principle already es-
tablished by the courts in any way, and I am not aware of any
pressing need. On the other hand, there is a danger in attempting
codification since one loses the flexibility of case law. Conse-
quently we feel it right to leave the [permitted acts] chapter as it
stands without this amendment. The Chapter sets out specific ex-
ceptions to copyright, all of them judged to be in the public inter-
est, and does so in a way which, as far as possible, puts clear
limits on the scope of the exception. It leaves in the hands of the
judges those exceptional cases where it is necessary to balance
public interest criteria with the rights of copyright owners.” 71
Hence as Burrell points out this indicates that a public interest defense
to copyright in English law was universally accepted by the legisla-
ture and that the reluctance to introduce an express statutory excep-
tion to copyright stemmed from the perceived need to preserve the
inherent flexibility of the exception as developed by case law.72
69 Report of the Committee to consider the Law on Copyright and Designs. March
1977.Cmnd 6732 page 170 Paragraph 667.
70 See Burrell at 403.
71 Hansard H.L. Vol.491 col.77 as cited in Burrell at 403.
72 Burrell at 403.
46
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845231266, am 26.10.2021, 12:36:37
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Lord Beaverbrook went onto state that,
“The Bill does not and cannot cover every aspect of the law of
copyright.”73
Thus the preceding statements indicate an intention on the part of the
legislature to preserve and uphold a public interest exception to copy-
right within the English legal framework, which is designed to act as
a mechanism by which to balance the competing interests of copy-
right holders and the public, where the statutory exceptions intro-
duced for such purpose by the legislature are inadequate to achieve
such a balance.
Therefore it is possible to argue that s.171(3) which constitutes a
general statement enabling the judiciary to take into account consid-
erations relating to the public interest in enforcing copyright was de-
signed to ensure that the judiciary would remain free to develop a
general public interest defense outside the bounds of the statute.74
This argument is further supported by Lord Beaverbrook’s statement
that,
“[s. 171(3)] acknowledges the continuing effect of case law with-
out attempting to codify it, thus leaving the law on this matter
where it has always been, in the hands of the courts. ”75
Hence it may be concluded that s.171(3) of the CDPA clearly pre-
serves the possibility of the introduction of a broad based public
interest exception to copyright in English law.
France
The current legal framework on French Copyright law is based upon
the 1957 Law on Literary and Artistic Property76 as amended by the
B.
73 Id. Hansard H.L. Vol.491 col.77.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Law No.57-298 of March 11, 1957, on the Literary and Artistic Property.
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1985 Law on Author’s Rights and the Rights of Performers.77 Both
copyright and author’s rights have further been codified in the 1992
Intellectual Property Code.78
The legislative history preceding the enactment of both Laws carry
indications as to the need to balance the rights of authors with that of
the public interest.
During the Parliamentary debates which led to the adoption of the
1957 Law, Marcel Boutet Vice-President and Rapporteur of the In-
tellectual Property Committee of the Government described the 1957
legislation as carrying into effect,
“…the synthesis of author’s rights and the interests of the pub-
lic, in the preeminence of the creator.79”(emphasis added)
The Law of 1957 introduced certain statutory exceptions to the rights
of authors, which were considered by one commentator to represent
certain concessions to copyright in the public interest.80 It was also
considered as a recognition of the right of the public to information
and culture.81
Similarly during the Parliamentary debates preceding the enact-
ment of the Law of 1985, the then Minister of Culture, Jack Lang
expressed the belief that the Bill represented a balance between the
rights of authors and performers and the needs of various interested
parties, including the public interest.82
Notwithstanding the sentiments expressed by the promoters of
these laws and the strong tradition of cultural heritage in French law
77 Law No. 85-660 of July 3, 1985 on Authors' Rights and on the Rights of Per-
formers, Phonogram and Videogram Producers and Audiovisual Communi-
cation Enterprises.
78 Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, on the Intellectual Property Code.
79 M Boutet, General Considerations [1958] XIX R.I.D.A. 13 as cited in Gillian
Davis Copyright and the Public Interest Sweet and Maxwell (2nd Ed. 2002)
at 152.
80 A Tournier An Appraisal of the Law [1958] XIX RIDA 79 as cited in Davis at
159.
81 E. Derieux, Bases de donnés et droit du public à l’information 21 Les Petites
Affiches 1998, 13, as cited in Davis at 159.
82 Journal Officiel, session of April 2, 1985.as cited in Davis at 157.
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that has consistently viewed copyright as a means by way of which
such heritage may be disseminated to the public, French copyright
law is considerably tilted in favor of protecting the rights of the author
as opposed to the free communication of thoughts and opinions under
which each citizen may … speak, write and print freely as guaranteed
under Article 11 of the Declaration of Human Rights.83
The limitations to the rights of authors in French law are rigidly
defined and the creation of novel exceptions is reserved for the leg-
islature, leaving the courts with the limited function of applying such
exceptions as provided by statute.84
However in recent times there has been greater willingness on the
part of the legislature to impose new restraints upon the exercise of
exclusive rights.
This is reflected for example by the legal measures introduced un-
der the Intellectual Property Code, which allows for a work to be used
without authorization where there is manifest abuse in the exercise
of the moral right of disclosure as well as other rights of exploitation
by a deceased author’s representative.85
Further a new statutory exception was introduced to remedy the
the restrictive interpretation given by the Cour de Cassation to the
“brief-quotation exception” in the Utrillo case of 1993.86 The case
concerned the reproduction of certain works of the painter Utrillo in
a miniature catalogue of a sale by public auction. The Court held that
the reproduction of a work in its entirety, regardless of its format,
cannot be held as a brief quotation under the brief-quotation exception
to copyright. The new statutory exception permits the complete or
83 As noted by Marcel Boutet “French law had from the beginning to choose
between two intellectual tendencies; one which attributed the pre-eminence to
the person of the author and the other that envisaged above all the purpose of
the book, that is to say it’s communication to the public.” See Boutet, General
Considerations [1958] XIX R.I.D.A. 13.
84 See Law No.57-298 of March 11, 1957, on the Literary and Artistic Property
L. 122-5-3.
85 Id. L.111-3, 121-3 and 122-9 as cited in Davis at 169.
86 Cass ass. Plen., November 5, 1993; [1994] 159 RIDA, 320 as cited in Davis
at 164.
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partial reproduction of works of graphic or three dimensional art in-
tended to appear in the catalogue of sale by public auction.87
In yet another decision the Cour de Cassation significantly upheld
the public’s right to information in allowing journalists to broadcast
short extracts of sporting events in news programs notwithstanding
the exclusive rights of the copyright holders to broadcast these
events.88
A new law relating to freedom of communication further extends
this approach by specifically limiting the exclusive right to broadcast
by providing that major events may not be exclusively broadcast in
such a way that an important section of the public maybe deprived of
the possibility of following them live or recorded on the free televi-
sion service.89
As noted by Davis the enactment of these new exceptions seem to
reflect a welcome tendency towards greater recognition by the leg-
islature of the need to take into account the public’s right to infor-
mation in the copyright context.90
In another decision the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris91 was
faced with the issue as to whether the unauthorized reproduction of
twelve paintings of Utrillo in a program sought to be broadcast over
television could be permissible use of such works. At the first instance
level the Court although recognizing that the complete reproduction
of a work could not come under the brief-quotation exception upheld
that such use was permissible in the light of the freedom of informa-
tion of the public under Article 10 of the ECHR which takes prece-
dence over national law.92 It determined that the right of the public
to information included the right to be informed rapidly and in an
appropriate manner of newsworthy cultural events and that the
87 Law number 97-283 of March 27,1997 Art. 17.
88 Cass lere civ. February 6, 1996 FOCA v. FR3, Legipresse Number 133, III, 87.
89 Law number 2000-179 of August 1, 2000 (Art. 21) as cited in Davis 168.
90 Davis at 164.
91 Jean Fabris v. Ste FRANCE 2 Trib. de grande instance de Paris, 3rd ch, February
23,1999.
92 Davis at 169.
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unauthorized reproduction did not interfere with the normal exploita-
tion of the work.
This decision was however overturned by the Court of Appeal,93
which significantly observed that the inherent principles of author’s
rights effected an adequate equilibrium between the freedom of ex-
pression and copyright by recognizing an exception for the accessory
usage of works. It went on to hold that in this instance the Defendants
could not proft from such exception since the use of the paintings did
not constitute an acccessory use of the copyrighted works. The Court
emphasized that under Article 10(2) the freedom of expression and
the right to information was subject to the protection of the rights of
third parties and that hence permission should have been sought to
show the paintings.94
This in turn brings us to a consideration as to the conduciveness of
the French copyright system to the introduction of a public interest
exception to copyright.
The French copyright system has always acknowledged the need
to achieve a balance between copyright and the interests of the public.
As Davis points out this is reflected throughout the development of
French copyright law. However although in recent times there has
been a clear trend on the part of the courts and the legislature towards
limiting the exclusive copyright in the interests of promoting the right
to information, these limitations have by far been introduced in rela-
tion to specific situations and to a limited degree. As such there is as
yet no doctrine in French law that is capable of general application,
that could be applied to a wide variety of situations in order to bring
about a balance between copyright and the freedom of expression.
However it is noted that the perceptible trend towards greater
recognition of the need to achieve an adequate equilibrium between
the rights of authors and performers and the public interest as well as
93 Cour d’appel de Paris, 4th. ch. May 30,2001.
94 Alain Strowel and François Tulkens Equilibrer La Liberte D’Expression et Le
Droit D’Auteur in Droit d’auteur et liberté d’expression: Regards franco-
phones, d’Europe at d’ailleurs 9 at 30 Larcier (2006).
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the strong tradition of cultural heritage in French copyright law may
furnish the necessary conditions to render the copyright legal frame-
work of France conducive to the introduction of a public interest ex-
ception to copyright.
Germany
The copyright framework of Germany has strong constitutional un-
derpinnings by virtue of its being derived from the basic rights guar-
anteed under the Grundgesetz (Constitution) of Germany.
The economic rights of copyright holders are protected under the
right to property in Article 14 of the Grundgesetz. Article 14 (2)
however takes cognizance of the fact that ‘properties impose duties
and that its use should also serve the public interest.’95
Under Article 3 of the Constitution expropriation is permitted only
in the public interest. It may take place only by or pursuant to law
which provides for compensation for such expropriation. The com-
pensation shall be determined upon just consideration of the public
interest and of the interests of the persons affected.
In addition the moral rights of authors are grounded upon the con-
stitutional guarantee of human dignity under Article 1 and the right
to personal freedom of the individual which is inviolable and may
only be encroached upon pursuant to a law.96
It is therefore evident that as far as the economic rights of the author
are concerned, the constitutional underpinning under Article 14 im-
C.
95 E. Ulmer Lettre d’Allemagne [1965] Copyright 275 at 282
“I believe in particular that the constitutional guarantee of property applies to
copyright. The basic law guarantees property. In constitutional language that
means that intellectual property is also guaranteed.”.
96 Decision of the Federal Supreme Court, November 26,1945, 15 B.G.H.Z. 249.
Recognized the existence of a general right to personality grounded in the Basic
Law (Grundgesetz), the court reasoned that the expression of ideas is an em-
anation of the personality of the author and that therefore the author had the
right to decide if, and in what form his writings should be distributed to the
public.
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bues them with a strong notion of public interest and requires the
exercise of these rights to be carried out in such a manner as to pro-
mote the social good. As Hugenholtz points out the express recogni-
tion of the social function of copyright provides a constitutional basis
for limiting overbroad copyright protection.
The argument for the limitation of copyright in the public interest
gains further momentum under the guarantee of the freedom of ex-
pression under Article 5 which as discussed above contains the right
to express and disseminate one’s opinion, the right of access to in-
formation and the freedom of the media.
Hence in comparison with the two jurisdictions discussed above,
namely France and England, it appears that the legal basis for the
introduction of a public interest exception to copyright is stronger in
Germany, owing to the strong constitutional basis of the copyright
framework with its emphasis on the social function of copyright.
A consideration of the legislative evolution of the law highlights
the consistent interpretation of copyright in terms of its social func-
tion as well the emphasis on the need to limit the scope of the exclu-
sive rights of the copyright holders, when it is so required in the public
interest.
One instance in which this approach to copyright was reiterated,
arose in the context of the debate which concerned the extension of
the German copyright term from 30 years to a 50 year period of pro-
tection.
A prominent figure among those opposing the extension of the term
Professor Ernst Heymann, expressed the view that German law, in
contrast with French law, was inspired by social factors; it took ac-
count of the interest of the community, to which the interests of the
individual should conform and even subordinate itself. He further
argued that the period of protection was not envisaged in Germany
as a limitation on a presumed perpetual intellectual property right but
rather as an additional period prolonging the death of the author.
Taking the various interests into account he concluded that the in-
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terests of the German nation should always take priority in mat-
ters of copyright.97
As de Boor noted, “If we wish to protect the creative personality,
it is not sufficient to provide him with a financial reward for his
work. Rather personal and cultural interests should be put for-
ward first.”98
In a different context he further suggested that the essential task of
copyright was the establishment of an equitable balance between au-
thors, commercial intermediaries and the general public.
The foregoing therefore gives an indication that the maintenance
of an effective equilibrium between the interests of the freedom of
expression and copyright has been a constant concern in the copyright
framework of Germany from a very early stage and thus may be con-
sidered an inherent characteristic of the basic conceptual framework
of German copyright law.
The current framework of German copyright law is contained in
the Act on Copyright and Related Rights of 196599 as amended.100
The Act contains a list of limitations to copyright which have been
imposed in the interests of public information in order to serve the
needs of cultual life.101
These include a specified list of limitations to the exercise of ex-
clusive rights, some of which allow for the free use of copyright-
protected material and others which provide for the limitation of
rights subject to the right of the copyright holder to the payment of
equitable remuneration for such use.
Following the enactment of the 1956 Act the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court was called upon to consider the constitutionality of
97 E. Heymann Die Zeitliche Begrenzung desUrhberrechts (Berlin, Prussian
Academy of Sciences,1927) cited in Davis at 189.
98 Hans Otto de Boor Letters from Germany (1928-1995) cited in Davis at 192.
99 Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urhebergesetz)
(1965).
100 Amendments 1972,1985 and 2007.
101 E. Ulmer Lettre d’Allemagne [1965] Copyright 275 at 277.
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the limitations introduced to copyright, on the basis of the extent to
which such limitations could be considered as justifiable in the public
interest under Article 14 (2) of the Constitution.
The decisions delivered by the Federal Constitutional Court in
these cases exemplify the court’s interpretation of the relationship
between copyright and the public interest under German law.102
For example in the “School-Book Case” which involved s. 46 of
the Act the court emphasized that the legislature being bound by the
Basic law must, in defining the privileges and duties that make up the
content of the right, preserve the fundamental substance of the prop-
erty guarantee under Article 14 while at the same time also keeping
in line with the other constitutional provisions.103
It further stated that the recognition in principle of the economic
rights to the author for his free disposal does not mean that thereby
every conceivable means of exploitation is constitutionally secured.
Thus it is for the legislature to establish adequate standards which
guarantee an appropriate exploitation and a utilisation that corre-
sponds to the nature and social meaning of the right.104
The court further stated that the constitutionality of the said pro-
vision hinges upon its justification of the public interest.
As Hugenholtz points out therefore, even without directly address-
ing free speech considerations, the property guarantee under the Ger-
man Constitution has been held to require that a balance be struck
between protecting copyright and the public interest.105
However it appears that the Constitutional Court has subjected this
balancing of interests to a test of proportionality.
In the Church Music case where the constitutional validity of s. 52
which permitted the unauthorized use of musical works in churches
102 Davis at 204.
103 Federal Constitutional Court July 7, 1971 Kirchen- und Schulgebrauch [1972]
3 IIC 395.
104 Davis at 206.
105 P. Bernt Hugenholtz Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe
www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/PBH-Engelberg.doc at 4.
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was considered, the Constitutional court made the following obser-
vation.
“The legislature is in principle required to attribute the economic
control of the creative work to the author and to allow him the
freedom to dispose of it at his own responsibility…legislation
moreover has the task of taking the interests of the general public
into consideration. Yet the power of the legislative provision is
not unlimited. Any restrictions on the right of use that is made
in the public interest must therefore be supported on legitimate
grounds. An excessive restriction that is not dictated by the social
demands on copyright cannot be justified by Article 14 (2) of the
Basic law…”106 (emphasis added)
Thus as pointed out by Davis the basic rule as regards property in the
form of intellectual creation is to give exclusive rights to the author.
The public interest exception under Article 14 (2) arises in a negative
sense and is subject to a balancing of interests on the basis of pro-
portionality. Hence for the public interest to prevail over the interests
of the author that interest must be sufficiently important to override
the constitutional guarantee of property.
It is evident that the determination as to whether or not a public
interest, sufficient to override the legitimate interests of the author
exists is a matter for the determination of the court, and hence the
court is allowed a considerable level of discretion in the balancing
exercise which must necessarily proceed from the application of the
proportionality test. Thus this test allows for a measure of flexibility
to the judiciary in making a balanced analysis as to what rights should
prevail in the interests of the public.
It maybe that the discretion afforded to the judiciary under Article
14 (2) is even broader than that offered under the fair use exception
since unlike the four step test which must be observed in making a
determination under the fair use exception, the courts are not ham-
106 Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, October 25 1978, [1979] 84
U.F.I.T.A 317.
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pered by any guidelines as to how the balancing exercise must be
carried out.
However in a recent instance the courts did take into account the
guarantee of the freedom of expression under Article 5 of the Con-
stitution in determining an issue as to the extent to which the limita-
tion of an author’s rights for the purposes of quotation could be per-
missible based on the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of
artistic expression under Article 5(3) of the Constitution.
In balancing the interests of copyright and the freedom of expres-
sion the Court engaged in a consideration of the significance of the
interference of the author’s rights and the commercial disadvantage
to the author caused by the unauthorized reproduction i.e the quota-
tion. Following such consideration they concluded that since the in-
terference with the author’s rights in the circumstances under review
were not significant and did not pose a danger of any noticeable
commercial disadvantage the economic rights of the author must take
second place to the right of the public for artistic analysis.107
Hence under this approach it may be argued that the use of quota-
tions of copyrighted material for a socially useful purpose such as the
creation of a novel yet derivative work such as illustrated under Hy-
pothetical 3, may be considered permissible use of such material un-
der the German legal framework.
It is noted that an analogy maybe drawn between the methodology
used by the judges in the present case and the four step test employed
in considering the fair use exception in the US, in terms of the factors
that were taken into account in determining as to whether the unau-
thorized reproduction of the material could be in the public interest
so as to override the exclusive copyright.
Thus it appears that the German copyright framework already in-
cludes a well-developed mechanism for the balancing of copyright
and the rights of the public based upon the concept of property rights
as a social good which must be exercised in the interests of society.
107 Federal Constitutional Court, 29 June 2000, Germania 3, 2001 GRUR149.
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On the other hand however, the general trend of the German courts
towards the interpretation of statutory limitations to copyright has
been that limitations may only be considered exceptionally, and par-
ticularly in cases where the constitutional rights of the author are
confronted with the constitutional rights of others.108
This seems to stem from the idea that a restrictive interpretation of
copyright exceptions is warranted in order that the author should be
given a reasonable share of the financial benefits as a result of his
constitutional rights.109
This is illustrated in the decision of the German Federal Supreme
Court in the Covered Reichstag case.110 The case concerned an art
project undertaken by a well known artist which involved the cover-
ing of the Berlin Reichstag in fabric. The Defendant took photographs
of the covered Reichstag without the permission of the artist and pro-
duced and sold postcards of the same. In his defense he claimed that
his act came within the exception under section 59(1) of the German
Copyright Act which provided that it shall be permissible to repro-
duce through photography works which are permanently located on
public ways, streets or places and to distribute and publicly commu-
nicate such copies.
In making its determination the Court balanced the interests of the
copyright holder against that of the public interest and stated that the
exception being a limitation to the social value that copyright usually
guaranteed, it should be interpreted narrowly.111 On the other hand it
observed that the copyright holder who agrees to put his work in a
public place dedicates his work to the general public who have an
interest in taking pictures of public places without a license from the
copyright holder. However it concluded that under the exception the
public interest takes a step back when the duration of a work is limited
108 Supra Covered Reichstag 605-606 as cited in Postel at 146.
109 Id.
110 Federal Supreme Court, Covered Reichstag GRUR 605 (2002).
111 Holger Postel, The Fair Use Doctrine in the U.S. American Copyright Act
and Similar Regulations in the German Law 5 CHI.-KENT J. INLTELL.
PROP 142, 155.
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as it was in this instance and that therefore the Defendant’s action did
not come within the scope of the exception.112
On the other hand the fact that the existing limitations to copyright
in German law constitute narrowly defined statutory exceptions
which are restrictively interpreted by the Courts, has the result that
in certain instances the legitimate interests of the public may be over-
ridden by copyright, notwithstanding the requirement in the Consti-
tution that these rights are to be exercised in a manner so as to promote
the social good. For example as Postel points out the exception under
section 49(2) of the German Copyright Act which sanctions the use
of copyright protected material for the purposes of news reporting is
limited to the use of material which has already been publicly dis-
seminated.
Hence under Hypothetical 1 the dissemination of the footage be-
longing to Sports TV would not be permissible, under German law
despite the evident public interest attached to the reporting of such
an event.
Thus it is noted that the Constitutional expression of copyright as
a social good combined with the guarantee of the freedom of expres-
sion within the Constitution has already served to establish within the
German legal tradition a strong perception as to the need to balance
the competing interests of copyright and the freedom of expression
in the public interest, although the manner in which the existing lim-
itations to copyright are framed may in certain instances not enable
the achievement of a successful balance between these competing
values. As such it may be seen that the prevailing conditions within
the German legal framework are exceedingly conducive to the intro-
duction of a broad based public interest exception to copyright.
112 Id.
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Potential Impediments to the Introduction of a
Public Interest Exception to Copyright
The EC Copyright Directive
The European Community (hereinafter the “EC”) does not have di-
rect competency in the field of copyright. Hence the EC legal frame-
work on copyright law is based upon a series of Community Direc-
tives which attempt to harmonize certain aspects of the law.
The current EC framework comprises seven Directives relating to
copyright i.e. the Computer Programs Directive,113 the Rental Rights
Direcive,114 the Term Directive,115 the Copyright Directive,116 the
Satellite and Cable Directive,117 the Database Directive118 and the
Resale Rights Directive.119 These Directives have been addressed to




113 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs.
114 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property.
115 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related
rights.
116 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information society.
117 Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satel-
lite broadcasting and cable retransmission.
118 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
1996 on the legal protection of databases.
119 Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27
September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original
work of art.
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The Directives constitute binding laws which Member States are
obliged to implement into their domestic legal frameworks. Hence
the provisions contained in these Directives can have a direct bearing
on the present discussion in terms of the manner in which they pro-
mote or hinder the introduction of a public interest defense within the
EC Member States. The Copyright Directive is of particular signifi-
cance in this respect.
The Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copy-
right and Related Rights in the Information Society (usually referred
to as the EC Copyright Directive) attempts to achieve harmonisation
within the EC legal framework with respect to several essential rights
of authors and neighbouring right holders, and the limitations and
exceptions that may be imposed upon these rights by the national
legislatures of Member States.120
Although the Directive applies expressly to the protection of copy-
right and related rights in the context of the internet, its application
is not limited to the protection of copyright in the information society
and it is of general application with regard to to all categories rights
and subject matter that fall within its scope.121
It guarantees to authors, performers, phonogram producers, pro-
ducers of films and broadcasting organisations the exclusive rights
to reproduction, communication and making available to the public
and distribution in respect of specified subject matter,122 and was
enacted with the primary objective of securing the implementation of
two international treaties into the EC legal framework, namely the
WIPO Copyright Treaty123 and the WIPO Performances and Phono-
grams Treaty.124
120 Stefan Bechtold Directive 2001/29/EC in Concise European Copyright law
Thomas Dreier and P Bernt Hugenholtz (eds.) 343 Kluwer Law (2006).
121 See Article 1(1).
122 See Articles 2,3 and 4.
123 World Intellectual Property Organization, Copyright Treaty Apr. 12, 1997 S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997).
124 World Intellectual Property Organization, Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, Apr. 12,1997, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997).
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The preamble of the Directive sets a positive note by acknowledg-
ing in Recital 31 that a fair balance of rights and interests must be
safeguarded between the various categories of right holders, as well
as between the different categories of rightholders and users of pro-
tected subject-matter.
Hence it appears that the Directive aims towards the achievement
of an equilibrium between the rights of copyright owners and the
public interest.
Towards this end a series of limitations are introduced under Ar-
ticle 5 of the Directive with respect to the rights granted therein.
However the manner in which these limitations are framed and pre-
sented pose a serious challenge to the possibility of the introduction
of a public interest exception to copyright in Europe.
Firstly these are rigidly defined and aimed to apply within a pre-
cisely delimited scope of application.
For example they apply with regard to reproductions made by pub-
licly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums or by
archives which are not for direct or indirect economic or commercial
advantage;125 use of copyrighted works for the purpose of illustration
for teaching or scientific research;126 and reproduction by the press
or use in connection with the reporting of current events to the extent
justified by the infamatory purpose.127 It is noted that save the man-
adatory limitation to the right of reproduction under Article 5(1) all
other limitations are merely optional.128
Hence it is evident that although the list of exceptions provided for
under Article 5 of the Copyright Directive form a comprehensive set
of limitations to copyright, the manner in which they are framed do
not allow the courts to exercise the necessary level of discretion so
as to use them in order to strike an equilibrium between copyright




128 See Articles 5(2) and (3).
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Further an even more serious challenge is posed to the introduction
of a public interest exception, under Recital 32 of the preamble to the
Directive which states that,
“This Directive provides for an exhaustive enumeration of ex-
ceptions and limitations to the reproduction right and the right
of communication to the public”. (emphasis added)
Therefore, the limitations set out under Article 5 of the Directive are
to be interpreted as being exhaustive with regard to the limitations
and exceptions that could be introduced by the EU Member States
within their domestic legal systems in relation to the right of repro-
duction and the right of communication to the public as provided
under the Directive.
Thus it appears that with regard to the two categories of rights
expressly mentioned therein, Member States are effectively prevent-
ed from introducing novel limitations or exceptions apart from those
expressly mentioned under Article 5.
Thus the primary issue that arises for consideration is as to whether
pursuant to Article 5 read with Recital 32, The EC Copyright Dir-
ective forms an effective bar to the introduction of a broad-based
general exception to copyright based upon the public interest in Eu-
rope.
The legislative history of the Copyright Directive is considerably
vague in relation to the objective sought to be achieved by the intro-
duction of the rule in Recital 32.
The Green paper which preceded the enactment of the Copyright
Directive deals only incidentally with the issue of the limitation of
the rights to be protected under the Directive.129
However a consideration of the general discussions which took
place during the drafting process as well as the general objective of
129 Green Paper: Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society. Com-
mission of the European Communities. Brussels 19.7.1995 COM(95)382 fi-
nal; Hugenholtz “Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly
Invalid 11 EIPR 501,501-502 [2001] http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugen-
holtz/opinion-EIPR.html.
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the Directive which as expressed in its long title relates to the har-
monization of copyright within the EU Member States, indicate that
the rule in Recital 32 was introduced primarily to ensure uniformity
in the application of limitations to copyright and neighbouring rights
within the EU and to minimize the confusion and the resulting im-
pediment to the free movement of goods and services within the EU
that would ensue as a result of the existence of divergent standards
of limitations.130
As noted in the explanatory memorandum to the proposal on the
enactment of the Copyright Directive, it was felt that without ad-
equate harmonization of copyright exceptions and the conditions of
their application, Member States might continue to apply different
categories of limitations to these rights in different forms.131
This serves to indicate that the purpose of Recital 32 was to ensure
harmonization of standards of copyright enforcement within the EU
Member States in relation to the rights specified in the Recital, as
opposed to the desire to merely strengthen the scope of these rights,
by ensuring that they would be encumbered by a minimum degree of
limitations.
Thus this serves to establish that the primary legislative intention
behind the introduction of the Copyright Directive, does not expressly
negate the introduction of a public interest exception to copyright in
130 See for example the statement on the draft Directive issued by the European
Federation of Journalists
EFJ Statement on the Draft Copyright Directive 22 December, 1999. http://
europe.ifj.org/en/articles/efj-statement-on-the-draft-copyright-directive-
“The EFJ urges the European Union Member States to ensure that the copy-
right directive establishes an exhaustive list of non-mandatory limitations in
Article 5...The harmonisation of limitations in Article 5 must be exhaustive,
because without harmonisation of the limitations, Member States might con-
tinue to apply a large number of different limitations and exceptions to these
rights and, consequently, apply these rights in different forms. On the other
hand, it is crucial for journalists and other authors in the digital environment
to have a strong legal protection against different interpretations of limita-
tions and exceptions between Member States in respect of their national laws.
131 See “EFJ Statement on the Draft Copyright Directive”, page 3.
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Europe although it deems desirable the establishment of a uniform
standard of copyright limitations within the EC Member States.
Article 5 of the Copyright Directive
Although defined in very specific terms the limitations introduced
under Article 5 can be seen to constitute a comprehensive body of
limitations to copyright.
As Hugenholtz observes,
“The Commission’s original aim of limiting the number of ex-
emptions to a bare minimum, enumerated in an exhaustive man-
ner, has backfired dramatically. In the course of the negotiations
in the Council Working Group the Member States have managed
to maintain most, if not all, of the limitations currently existing in
national law. Thus, article 5 now lists no fewer than 20 possible
exemptions. An exhaustive list indeed!”132
It is further noted that the limitations set out under Article 5 do suc-
ceed in encompassing a wide spectrum of instances where the use of
a copyright-protected work would be in the legitimate interests of the
public.
For example Article 5(3)(k) which provides an exception with re-
gard to the use of copyrighted material for the purposes of caricature,
parody and pastiche offers a basis upon which to balance the eco-
nomic interests of copyright holders against the freedom of expres-
sion of the public and individual artists to utilize copyrighted material
for the purposes of jest and social commentary.
Hence although it is admitted that the limitations do not allow the
legislature or the judiciary adequate flexibility to engage in a broad-
based balancing exercise between the competing values of copyright
and the interests of the public, it does offer limited scope for the bal-
1.
132 Hugenholtz Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly In-
valid 11 EIPR 501,502 [2001] http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/
opinion-EIPR.html.
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ancing of the competing values of copyright protection and the le-
gitimate interests of the public with regard to the particular instances
defined under Article 5.
However notwithstanding the limited possibility offered under the
Directive for the balancing of copyright and the public interest, sub-
stantial arguments exist in favour of the introduction of a broad-based
general exception to copyright independent of Article 5 of the EC
Copyright Directive.
Firstly although the limitations set out under Article 5 are fairly
comprehensive in scope they cannot foresee all possible instances
which would require the limitation of copyright in the public interest.
Secondly as has been noted earlier, save the mandatory limitation
to the right to reproduction under Article 5(1) all other limitations are
merely optional and are to be adopted by Member States at their dis-
cretion.133 Thus all the limitations set out under Article 5 may not in
fact be available within the legal systems of all Member States, which
would necessitate the existence of a general exception to copyright
in order to effect an adequate equilibrium between copyright and the
public interest.
Overcoming the Bar under Recital 32
Hence it remains to be considered as to whether possible means exist
by which the bar placed by Recital 32 to the introduction of further
limitations and exceptions to the rights enumerated thereunder may
be circumvented.
2.
133 Article 5(2) “Member States may provide for exceptions and limitations to
the reproduction right provided for in Article 2 in the following cases…”
(emphasis added)
Article 5(3) “Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the
rights provided for in Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases…”(emphasis
added).
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A possible means of achieving this may be by basing the public
interest exception to copyright upon the freedom of expression and
the right to information as guaranteed under Article 10 of the ECHR.
Since the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR form
an external and overriding consideration to the principles enumerated
within the Directive, this would make it possible to argue that a public
interest exception based upon these freedoms form an overriding
consideration external to the scope of the rule in the Directive.
Although the EU is not a party to the ECHR, the ECHR does reg-
ulate the conduct of the EU within its own legal order since it has
been incorporated into the EU Law. Article 6 (2) of the Treaty of the
European Union states that ‘The Union shall respect fundamental
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention…and as they result
from the constitutional traditions common to the member states, as
general principles of law.’
As established in the case of Karner134 the possibility exists to
challenge the validity of EC legislation on the basis of its incompat-
ibility with fundamental rights as recognized under EU law. In this
respect the fundamental freedoms enumerated under the ECHR is of
special significance.135
The case of Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet,136 was an in-
stance in which Article 4(2) of the EC Copyright Directive which
134 C 71/02 Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v. Trootswjik GmbH
ECR I-3025 [2004].
135 Id. para. 48 “...according to settled case-law, fundamental rights form an
integral part of the general principles of law the observance of which the
Court ensures. For that purpose, the Court draws inspiration from the con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the guidelines
supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which
the Member States have collaborated or to which they are signatories. The
ECHR has special significance in that respect (see, inter alia, Case C-260/89
ERT [1991] ECR I-2925, paragraph 41; Case C-274/99 P Connolly v Com-
mission [2001] ECR I-1611, paragraph 37; Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères
[2002] ECR I-9011, paragraph 25; and Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003]
ECR I-5659 paragraph 71). ”.
136 C-479/04 Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet ECR 1-8089 [2006].
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provides that the distribution right of copyright holders shall not be
exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies
of the work except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership
in the Community is made by the rightholder, was sought to be in-
validated before the European Court of Justice.
The arguments put forward in support of the invalidation of the
provision proceeded upon the basis inter alia that the provision had
the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of their right to receive
information, as well as the freedom of copyright holders to commu-
nicate their ideas and hence was in breach of Article 10 of the ECHR.
The ECJ, citing the case of Kaner upheld the principle that in ac-
cordance with settled case-law, fundamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of law of the EU137 and that the freedom
of expression, enshrined in Article 10 of the ECHR, is a fundamental
right the observance of which is ensured by Community courts138
The Court in this instance found that Article 4(2) did not result in
an infrignement of the freedom of expression as guaranteed under
Article 10 of the ECHR.139
However it concluded that the rule under Article 4(2) maybe ca-
pable of restricting the freedom of citizens of the Union of their right
to receive information under Article 10 of the ECHR.
Significantly however the ECJ cited 10(2) of the ECHR which
states that the freedom of expression and the right to information as
guaranteed under Article 10(1) maybe subject to limitations justified
by objectives of the public interest,
“…in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law,
motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that pro-
vision and necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justi-
137 Id para. 61 citing Karner.
138 Id para. 62 citing ERTC-260/89 [1991] ECR I-2925, para. 44.
139 Id. para. 63.
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fied by a pressing social need and, in particular, proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued.”140 (emphasis added)
Accordingly they held that in this instance, the alleged restriction on
the freedom to receive information was justified in the light of the
need to protect intellectual property rights, including copyright,
which form part of the right to property.141
Hence the decision of the ECJ in the Laserdisken case forms a
recognition that the restriction of the freedom of expression and the
right to information under EC law maybe justified if it is necessary
for the purpose of the protection of intellectual property, which in the
interpretation of the court evidently constitutes a ‘pressing-social
need’ the protection of which may comprise a legitimate reason for
the restriction of fundamental freedoms as guaranteed under the
ECHR.
Thus the issue arises as to whether the rule in Recital 32 may simi-
larly be found to be justified in the interests of the protection of in-
tellectual property.
It is submitted however that it may be possible to distinguish the
rule in Recital 32 from Article 4(2) of the Copyright Directive, and
to make an argument against the validity of the restriction imposed
upon the freedom of expression and the right of information under
Recital 32 on the basis that it contravenes the principle of propor-
tionality, which is a basic tenant of Community law.
140 Id. para. 64 citing C-71/02 Karner ECR I-3025 [2004], para.50. “Whilst the
principle of freedom of expression is expressly recognized by Article 10
ECHR and constitutes one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic society,
it nevertheless follows from the wording of Article 10(2) that freedom of
expression is also subject to certain limitations justified by objectives in the
public interest, in so far as those derogations are in accordance with the law,
motivated by one or more of the legitimate aims under that provision and
necessary in a democratic society, that is to say justified by a pressing social
need and, in particular, proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. ” (em-
phasis added).
141 Id. para. 65.
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The principle of proportionality as recognized under EU law re-
quires that measures implemented through Community law provi-
sions must be,
(a) appropriate for attaining the objective pursued, and;
(b) must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve it.142
As per the dicta in the case of Karner derogations to fundamental
freedoms by provisions in EC law are similarly subject to the test of
proportionality.
Hence it follows that in line with the above dicta, derogations in
EC legislation from the freedom of expression in the interests of
copyright protection should,
(a) be appropriate for attaining the protection required, and;
(b) must not go beyond what is necessary for attaining such protec-
tion.
It is submitted that the blanket restriction imposed by Recital 32 upon
the introduction of limitations to copyright external to those enacted
under Article 5, is neither appropriate nor necessary for the attainment
of the objective sought by it which is the achievement of enhanced
standards of uniformity in copyright protection within the Member
States of the EU.
It is noted that as observed earlier the rule in Recital 32 effectively
vetoes the ability of Member States to bring about an adequate bal-
ance between the competing values of copyright protection and the
preservation of the freedom of expression and the right to information
in relation to uses which do not come within the activities enumerated
under Article 5. In the light of the public interest dimension of copy-
right which sees the ultimate aim of copyright as the promotion of
social good, such a restriction comprises an unwarranted protection
of the interests of copyright holders as against the interests of the
public and therefore goes beyond what is ‘necessary’ for the legiti-
mate protection of copyright.
142 C-491/01 British American Tobacco (Investments) and Imperial Tobacco
ECR I-11453 [2002], para 122.
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Although the limitations set out under Article 5 can be seen to form
a comprehensive list of limitations, these cannot be considered to
constitute an exhaustive list of instances which could give rise to a
potential conflict between copyright and the legitimate interests of
the public vis a vis the preservation of their fundamental freedoms
As Hugenholtz comments in the context of uses of copyrighted
materials on the internet,
“The last thing the information industry needs in these dynamic
times are rigid rules that are cast in concrete for the years to
come. How can a legislature in his right mind even contemplate
an exhaustive list of limitations, many of which are drafted in
inflexible, technology-specific language, when the Internet pro-
duces new business models and novel uses almost each day?”143
It is observed that this argument may be held valid not only with
regard to uses in the internet but with regard to the use of copyrighted
material in all other contexts as well.
It is noted that the three-step test incorporated into the Directive
under Article 5 (5) should in combination with the list of copyright
limitations, provide a basis for bringing about a sufficient degree of
harmony within Community copyright law.144 Hence the imposition
of a further restriction on the Member States in the form of an ex-
hautive list of limitations seems an unwarranted as well as unneces-
sary measure for the purpose of securing an enhanced level of har-
monization of copyright within the EU. The futility of such a provi-
sion is further highlighted in terms of the fact that the Directive itself
does not succeed in securing any great measure of harmonization
143 Hugenholtz “Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly In-
valid 11 EIPR 501,502 [2001] http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/
opinion-EIPR.html.
144 Article 5(5) "The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1,2,3
and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with
the normal exploitation of the work or other subject matter and do not un-
reasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”.
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within the EU by virtue of the fact that most limitations introduced
under it are to be adopted by Member States at their discretion.
Hence it may be argued that Recital 32 read with Article 5 of the
Copyright Directive may be challenged upon the basis that it consti-
tutes a derogation from the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under
Article 10 of the ECHR in a manner that is not proportionate to the
legitimate aim of the provision.
Thus it may be considered that the possibility exists for Member
States to circumvent the impediment placed by the EC Copyright
Directive and to enact a broad-based public interest exception to
copyright within their domestic legal systems.
The Berne Convention and the Three-Step Test
All EU Member States are also signatories to the Berne Convention.
The EU being a Member State of the World Trade Organization, all
EU Member States are bound by the TRIPS Agreement145 and hence
have adhered to the Paris Act of the Berne Convention of 1971.146
Thus the provisions of the Berne Convention Paris Act with regard
to the the limitation of copyright, particularly Article 9 (2) are binding
upon the EU legal framework as well as the domestic legal frame-
works of the individual Member States.
As such the “three-step test” to copyright limitations under Article
9 (2) has also been incorporated into several of the EC Directives on
Copyright law, namely the Computer Programs Directives, the
Database Directive, the Rental Rights Directive and as mentioned
earlier the Copyright Directive.
B.
145 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs)
(Annex 1C to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
146 Thomas Dreier Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works in Concise European Copyright law Thomas Dreier and P Bernt
Hugenholtz (eds.) 9 Kluwer Law (2006).
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It has also found expression in many of the international agree-
ments and conventions to which the EU (as well as the EU Member
States individually) have acceded. For example Article 13 of the
TRIPS Agreement, Article 10 (2) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
(WCT) and Article 16 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty (WPPT) all incorporate the three step test in some form.
The Three-Step Test
The three-step test which was first introduced through the Berne
Convention was enacted upon the need to achieve two contradictory
goals in the harmonization of international copyright law.
a) To safeguard the general right of reproduction against the corro-
sive effect of potentially wide-ranging national limitations by the
introduction of a framework within which limitations to copy-
right could be imposed under domestic laws.
b) To avoid encroaching upon the margin of freedom enjoyed by
member countries in imposing limits to copyright granted under
the domestic legal frameworks. This was achieved by introducing
a fairly open-ended norm upon which limitations maybe con-
structed, in place of a restrictive list of permissible criteria. Thus,
legislatures of Member States are bound under the Berne Con-
vention as well as under subsequent instruments into which the
test has been incorporated to ensure that limitations to copyright
must be imposed in compliance with the three-step test.
The need to achieve these paradoxical goals necessitated that the test
be framed in somewhat vague and possibly ambiguous terms, which
makes it subject to conflicting interpretations at times.
The three-step test under Article 9 (2) of the Berne Convention is
worded as follows,
“It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union
to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases,
provided that such reproduction does not conflict with the nor-
1.
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mal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably preju-
dice the legitimate interests of the author.”
Thus the test incorporates three cumulative criteria in determining
the compliance of a copyright limitation with the Berne Convention.
1. Basic rule: the limitations introduced to copyright must relate to
“certain”, “special” cases.
Conditions delimiting the basic rule:
2. The limitation should not conflict with the normal exploitation of
the work.
3. The limitation should not prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author.147
It is significant to note that although the Berne Convention makes the
three-step test applicable only in relation to the reproduction right
Article 16 of the WPPT, Article 10 (2) of the WCT and Article 13 of
the TRIPS Agreement extends it to all categories of exclusive rights
protected under these instruments.
In fact as interpreted by the WTO Panel in its decision on s.110 (5)
of the United States Copyright Act, Article 13 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment extends to all exclusive rights protected under the Agreement
including those rights preserved under the Berne Convention148
which have been incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement under Ar-
ticle 9 (1).
147 Martin Senftleben Copyright Limitations and the Three-Step Test 131 Kluwer
Law (2004).
148 This is however with the exception of moral rights preserved under Article
6bis of the Berne Convention which has been expressly excluded from the
TRIPS Agreement. It is noted however that that since no similar exclusion
can be found under the WCT, it is possible to argue that the three-step test as
preserved under the WCT would apply in relation to the moral rights granted
under Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. Nor does the three-step test apply
to the economic rights vested in performer’s producers and broadcasting or-
ganizations under the TRIPS Agreement. Vide Article 14 (6); Haochen Sun.
“Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law“ 5 NW. J. TECH. & IN-
TELL. PROP. 265 at page 275.
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The Panel determined that the ‘minor exceptions doctrine’ intro-
duced with regard to the public performance right under Articles
11bis(1) and 11(1) of the Berne Convention had been carried onto
the TRIPS Agreement under Article 9 of the Agreement. Hence they
concluded that the three-step test as incorporated under Article 13 of
the Agreement would apply in relation to limitations to the repro-
duction right as articulated in the Berne Convention as well as to
limitations and exceptions placed on the public performance, in ac-
cordance with the minor exceptions doctrine.149
The three-step test directly constrains the ability of member states
to introduce limitations to copyright which are not in compliance with
the above criteria. As Geiger points out,
“It would not only be the legislator’s freedom of adaptation of the
system of exceptions that would be “limited” by the imprecise rule
of the three- step test but, also the judge’s discretionary pow-
er.”150
The issue arises therefore as to whether the test can impose a barrier
to the introduction of a broad and open ended public interest excep-
tion to copyright.
In this regard the decision delivered by the World Trade Organi-
zation Panel on United States-Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright
Act151 is of considerable relevance as this is the first instance in which
a definition of the criteria of the test was offered at the international
level.
149 WT/L/160/Rev. 1 para. 6.35.
150 Christophe Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of
Copyright Law to the Information Society. E-Copyright Bulletin. January-
March 2007. http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/34481/11883823381te
st_trois_etapes_en.pdf/test_trois_etapes_en.pdf.
151 Report of the Panel on United States-Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright
Act. 15 June, 2000. (WT/L/160/Rev. 1).
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The WTO Panel decision involved a determination as to the com-
patibility of the “home-style”152 and “business-style”153 exemptions
to copyright under s.110(5)(A) and s.110(5)(B) of the US Copyright
Act with Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. The determination of
this issue necessarily required an inquiry as to the interpretation of
the three-step test under Article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement. In this
instance the Panel interpreted the three-step test under the TRIPS
Agreement as follows.
The Basic Rule: Limitations to relate to “certain” and “special”
cases
The first criterion of the test lays down the basic rule upon which
limitations should be imposed. As Senftleben points out copyright
limitations which are incapable of fulfilling this basic rule are in-
evitably doomed to fail.154
As such it is imperative to consider whether a general exception to
copyright in the nature of the public interest exception does in fact
comply with this basic rule.
One approach has been to interpret special cases to mean definite,
fixed, non-variable limitations to copyright. According to Reinboth
2.
152 The so-called “homestyle” exemption, provided for in sub-paragraph (A) of
Section 110(5), allows small restaurants and retail outlets to amplify music
broadcasts without an authorization of the right holders and without the pay-
ment of a fee, provided that they use only homestyle equipment (i.e. equip-
ment of a kind commonly used in private homes).World Trade Organization.
United States-s.110(5) of US Copyright Act http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds160_e.htm.
153 Id. The so-called “business” exemption, provided for in sub-paragraph (B) of
Section 110(5), essentially allows the amplification of music broadcasts,
without an authorization and a payment of a fee, by food service and drinking
establishments and by retail establishments, provided that their size does not
exceed a certain square footage limit. It also allows such amplification of
music broadcasts by establishments above this square footage limit, provided
that certain equipment limitations are met.
154 Senftleben at 132.
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and von Lewisnki the term “certain special cases” is to be interpreted
as requiring national laws to contain sufficient specifications which
identify the cases to be exempted from these rights.155 Unspecified
wholesale exemptions are not permitted. Based upon this interpreta-
tion it is clear that the public interest exception would not succeed in
passing the test, since the limitations it places upon copyright would
necessarily be based upon value judgements which would not ne-
cessarily be capable of prior specific identification.
However Senftleben argues that this in fact is not the proper inter-
pretation to be given to the term “certain special cases”. In his view
the term “certain” is to be interpreted as “some special cases”. He
justifies his argument by pointing out that the interpretation of the
term as referring to “definite”, “fixed and non-variable limitaitons”
would effectively go against the common law Anglo-American legal
tradition which necessarily prefers to impose open-ended limitations
of copyright.156
The WTO Panel decision interpreted the first criterion of the three-
step test as involving the following elements.
Firstly that the exception or limitation in national legislation should
be clearly defined.157 Significantly however the Panel proceeded to
observe that this did not require national legislatures to,
“…identify explicitly each and every possible situation to which
the exception could apply, provided the scope of the exception is
known and particularized. This provides a sufficient degree of
legal certainty.”158
Hence it may be argued that what is in fact required under the three
step test is that the limitation to be placed upon copyright should be
of a defined and specified scope in order that there may be certainty
155 Jőrg Reinboth and Silke von Lewinski The WIPO Treaties 1996- The WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty-
Commentary and Legal Analysis 124 Butterworths (1996).
156 Senftleben at 136.
157 WT/L/160/Rev. 1 Para 6.108.
158 Id. para. 6-108.
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as to the manner in which it may be applied by courts. This does not
however necessitate that there should be certainty or foreseeability
as to the result that would be reached through its application.
The same argument has been made with regard to the fair use ex-
ception in the US. Several scholars have pointed out that the very
flexibility of the doctrine forms an obstacle to it being “certain”.159
However as Senftleben points out the case-by-case analysis is a
typical feature of the common law approach to copyright limitation.
Each holding of a US Court rendered on the basis of the fair use
exception clarifies whether or not a given specific use under exami-
nation maybe fair. Thus upon this argument the limitation placed by
the fair use exception would be specific as regards that particular case.
Secondly it is required that an exception or limitation should be
limited in its field of application or exceptional in its scope. In other
words it should be narrow in a quantative as well as a qualitative
sense.160
In its decision the WTO Panel while holding that the “business-
style exemption” to copyright was not in compliance with Article 13
since “…a substantial majority of eating and drinking establishments
and close to half of retail establishments are covered by the exemp-
tion...”,161 held that the “home-style exemption” to copyright was in
compliance with the three-step test since from a quantative perspec-
tive the reach of such exemption was limited to a comparably small
percentage of establishments.162 It thus constituted a “certain special
case” within the meaning of the first criterion of Article 13.
It would appear that upon this reasoning it may be possible to argue
that the public interest exception to copyright consitutes a quanta-
tively and qualitatively sufficiently narrow doctrine so as to satisfy
the three-step test under the TRIPS Agreement.
159 Herman Cohen Jehoram Einige Grundsatz zu den Ausnahmen im Urheber-
recht GRUR INT 807 (2001).
160 WT/L/160/Rev. 1 para. 6.109.
161 Id. para. 6.133.
162 Id. para. 6.143.
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Firstly the exception would not possess an expansive reach since
its application would be limited to those special cases which neces-
sitates a balance between copyright and the legitimate interests of the
public. As demonstrated by the case law in the three jurisdictions
discussed above the instances that could give rise to such a consid-
eration of competing values are not so frequent as to render the ex-
emption to be one of an expansive scope.
On the other hand it is possible to argue that as discussed above,
since the Copyright Directive already sets out quite a comprehensive
list of limitations to copyright largely based upon the public interest,
the public interest exception would apply largely as a supplementary
doctrine to these limitations and the other statutory limitations and
exceptions introduced by the national legislatures of Member States.
Hence it would be possible to argue that its application is limited to
a sufficiently restricted scope of instances as to make it a “certain
special case” within the first criterion of the three-step test.
Thus it appears that a public interest exception to copyright con-
taining a definite scope and operating within a well-defined frame-
work which is applied by courts in such a way that takes the legitimate
interests of the rightholder into account so as not to conflict with the
normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legit-
imate interests of the author would be compliant with the three step
test.
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Conclusion
The preceding discussion serves to demonstrate that considerable
scope does in fact exist within the copyright frameworks of England,
France and Germany for the introduction of a broad-based, general
exception to copyright based upon the legitimate interests of the pub-
lic.
In England in particular, the groundwork for the introduction of a
public interest exception has already been laid with the enactment of
section 171(3) of the Copyright Act, which is further supported by a
substantial body of case-law that outlines the manner in which such
an exception maybe constructed. In combination these serve to es-
tablish a solid jurisprudential foundation for the introduction of a po-
tential public interest exception within the English legal system.
On other hand the discernible trend on the part of the legislature
and the judiciary of France towards granting greater consideration to
the freedom of expression and the right to information of the public
in the application of copyright law, coupled with the strong philo-
sophical underpinnings of copyright as a mechanism for the promo-
tion of cultural heritage, form positive elements which could prove
conducive to the introduction of a public interest exception to copy-
right within the French legal tradition.
As observed earlier the strong constitutional basis of the copyright
legal framework of Germany with its focus on the achievement of an
effective equilibrium between copyright and the freedom of expres-
sion and the right to information provides an ideal basis for the in-
troduction of public interest exception to copyright.
It is noted that of the three European jurisdictions reviewed in the
course of the thesis Germany provides by far the most conducive
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The need for a mechanism by which to achieve an effective equi-
librium between the competing values of copyright and the freedom
of expression and the right to information constitutes an imperative
concern, in the light of the exponential growth of the information and
communications industry in recent times which herald the gradual
transition of the modern social order to a knowledge based society.
The success of such a social order would hinge upon the ability of
its members to freely access information as well as to use and dis-
seminate such information in the public interest. Thus the freedom of
expression and the right to information would constitute the vital
linchpin upon which a modern knowledge-based society is founded.
It is submitted that the traditional exceptions and limitations to
copyright which exist within the legal frameworks of EU Member
Countries are not equipped to adequately preserve and further these
fundamental freedoms nor to face the rapid advancements and trans-
formations taking place in the manner in which copyright protected
works are created and disseminated in modern society.
Hence in the overall context of Europe there is considerable need
as well as scope for the development of a public interest exception to
copyright, although the necessary political and jurisprudential will
for the development of such an exception seems largely lacking.
Hence it is hoped that the foregoing discussion would serve to
contribute towards the stimulation of a general discussion as to the
potential introduction of a public interest exception to copyright in
Europe, in order that the future copyright framework of Europe may
be well equipped to face the challenges of today’s world.
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Abstract
This paper constitutes an exploration of the prevailing discord bet-
ween the competing values of copyright and the freedom of expres-
sion and the right to information in Europe. It seeks to analyze the
possibility of resolving this discord through the introduction of a
public interest exception to the legal framework on copyright in the
European Union. In the course of this analysis, it engages in a com-
parative survey of the developments taking place in the copyright law
systems of England, Germany and France vis a vis copyright, the
freedom of expression and the public interest. Throughout the anal-
ysis, reference is made to the fair-use exception in the US as a model
for the introduction of a potential public interest exception to copy-
right in Europe and parallels are drawn between the approaches taken
in the US and Europe with regard to copyright and the freedom of
expression.
 
Keywords: Freedom of Expression, Right to Information, Public
Interest Exception, the Fair-Use Exception, EC Copyright Directive
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